Tuesday, 30 November 2010

Resume (Final Paper) PT. HOLCIM INDONESIA , tbk.






Company’s Profile
Holcim is a pioneer and an innovator in Indonesia’s fast-developing cement sector, as the market for homes, commercial buildings and infrastructure expands. It is the only provider of a fully integrated range of nine cement types, concrete and aggregates. It is building a unique franchise in delivering complete, affordable housing solutions and upgrades, drawing on the skills of over 3,000 Holcim trained masons, over 43 franchisees and over 9,000 retail outlets across the island of Java.
Holcim Indonesia is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) under the reference SMCB. The company was in fact the first to be listed on the inauguration of the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1977 and has been an actively traded counters ever since.
A total of 7,662,900,000 shares are currently in issue as at December 31st, 2008 with 939,033,401 shares, the equivalent of 12.25% of the total stock in the hand of the general public. Holcim Group, through subsidiary companies, holds a beneficial interest of 77.33% of total stock being 5,925,912,820 shares. The remaining portion of 10.41%, being 797,953,779 shares, is held by foreign investors.
Analysis of Financial Condition
According to the analysis, Holcim’s ability to full fill short term liabilities is not good enough because the company liquidity is less than one, then Holcim also have a low daily credit sales. But, Holcim laso have a positive mark Holcim has high rate of inventory turnover, it means that Holcim has a good ability to use their assets efficiently and also as a company based on the profitability analysis and calculation Holcim have a good ability to make a profit. Based on Dupont Analysis, Holcim is a strong company because its ROE increase year by year although in 2007 the ROE decrease.
Analysis of Company’s Stock
AVERAGE
2126,029
2160,392
2091,863
2129,265
10474374
2129,877
STANDARD DEVIATION
272,577
273,5766
266,8447
268,323
7564361
268,7768
HIGHEST
2525
2525
2450
2500
40495500
2500
LOWEST
1550
1600
1530
1570
378500
1570



In stock investing, investors will always consider the risk and the results. The investors hope that investors faced higher risk so will expected higher results. We can see the risk of the stock from the standard deviation of the data. The higher standard deviation, the higher risk of these shares.
In addition to consider issues of risk and the results, investors also consider the problem of the average value of the stock price and volume. With the presence of these relationships, the value of a company is reflected in stock prices in the capital market for companies that go public. Thus the development of a company's share price also reflects the development of enterprise value.
Because of standard deviation and the average value af the stock pice and volume, investors will determine whether they would buy the stock or not.

Monday, 29 November 2010

Deflation Investments: How to Protect Yourself if Prices Fall

Investors need to kick the inflation state of mind. You’re huddling in short-term bond funds or fretting about a bond bubble because you’re sure that hyperinflation lies right around the corner. But the case against it is stronger than you think. Consumer prices rose only 1.2 percent in July, compared with a year ago. Near-zero inflation or mild deflation is the stronger bet.

Long-term bonds and certificates of deposit would be the right investment, in that kind of world. Stocks could outperform, too, as long as deflation doesn’t get out of hand. Dividend stocks get especially interesting. Even if dividends don’t rise, they’d be worth more in purchasing power if the general price level declined.
What sparks inflation fears is the widely held belief that the government has been “printing money,” with the federal deficit as Exhibit A. But the public has this wrong, says economist Lacy Hunt of Hoisington Investment Management.

It’s true that, during the credit crisis, the Federal Reserve puffed up its balance sheet by buying toxic assets from financial institutions. It also bought Treasuries, to add liquidity to the banking system. But those actions don’t print money, Hunt says. Commentators who throw that phrase around often don’t know what they’re talking about.
“Money” is the legal tender that you can readily exchange for goods and services. It’s the cash in your pocket and your checking account, plus savings accounts, short-term certificates of deposits, and similar liquid caches. Technically, the Fed calls this M2.

Too much money sloshing around in an economy can drive prices up, but that’s hardly the case today. M2 has risen only 2 percent over the past 12 months, Hunt says. That’s the slowest rate of increase in 15 years and less than one-third of the average increase over the past 110 years. It’s helping to keep inflation on the barely-positive side but can’t fuel a surge.

What’s more, that money isn’t turning over very fast. Banks aren’t pumping out loans to create new deposits, against which even more loans could be made. The turnover rate, called “velocity,” historically declines when the banking system is digging out of an excessive lending spree, Hunt says. We’re getting less bang for each buck.

The third piece of this story is excess capacity in the economy — too many unsold houses, too much empty retail space, too many people unemployed and tapped out. Even if business improves and demand picks up, so much unsold inventory will appear on the market that prices could still hold flat or fall.

In a normal business cycle, you get a year or two of pain followed by five or six years of gain. But economies don’t function in the normal pattern during periods of heavy indebtedness, Hunt says. Increased government spending provides a temporary boost. Then you roll back.

Deficits don’t automatically lead to inflation, as some people think. Japan’s deflationary cycle is in its 15th year, despite (or because of) a government debt that now stands at 200 percent of gross domestic product. (In the U.S., the debt held by the public has reached 53 percent of GDP.)
No one can predict the future, which is what makes investing such a risk.  But there’s no sense in hedging only against inflation in these difficult times. You need a deflation hedge, too. Here’s what to consider:

Long-term Treasury bonds and bond funds.
Long Treasuries currently yield 3.7 percent. If yields decline just one percentage point, to 2.7 percent, you’d pocket a one-year gain of 23.4 percent. Do you doubt that Treasuries could fall that far? In 1941, they dipped as low as 1.9 percent.

Wasatch-Hoisington’s U.S. Treasury Fund invests primarily in bonds maturing in 20 years or more. It’s up almost 19 percent this year and 8.9 percent a year over the past 10 years. “We will stay with long bonds until the inflationary dynamic changes,” Hunt says.

It can be a bumpy ride. If long rates rise by one percentage point, you’d lose 11.5 percent. Still, it’s hard to find a better investment as a deflation hedge.

High-yield bond funds present higher than usual risk in deflationary environments. More companies will default on their interest and principal payments. High quality corporate bonds remain attractive but watch the call dates (the earliest date that the company can force the bond to be redeemed). If interest rates fall, your bond will probably be called away. Consider a mutual fund, where the manager will be watching the call dates for you.

Long-term certificates of deposit.
Today’s CDs will look good, if deflation brings long-term interest rates down. Top-ranked five-year certificates pay in the 2.7 percent range. A decline in prices of 1 percentage point would give you an effective return of 3.7 percent in purchasing power.

Stocks.
The U.S. stock market tends to thrive after periods of mild deflation, says Andy Engel, senior research analyst for The Leuthold Group, an investment advisory firm. Looking back to 1926, he found 34 quarters when consumer prices fell by no more than 2.4 percent. Over the following year, Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index rose by an average 18.2 percent, as investors looked ahead to better times, Engel says.

It wasn’t all joy. Eleven of these quarters, all in the 1930s, led to severe deflation — periods when stocks get creamed. But there were bull markets even during the Depression. After the mild deflation of March 1936, for example, stock prices soared for the following two years.

We’ve had three mild deflations since World War II, associated with the recessions starting in 1949, 1953, and 2007. The deflation of 2009 preceded the big stock bounce in the spring of 2010.

Cash.
Money in savings accounts and money market funds falls behind when inflation is merely low, as is the case today. But deflation raises the value of investments that are guaranteed.

Deflation — even when mild — is brutal for debtors, workers whose wages and hours are cut, the unemployed, and businesses that are forced to cut prices below their costs. We’ve experienced only short spurts of falling prices in modern times, after which jobs came back. A long deflationary cycle, under high debt, could change the game.
Source

Qatar Sept deflation mildest in 2010, prices seen up

Qatar's consumer prices fell 0.9 percent on an annual basis in September, their mildest deflation so far this year, data showed on Wednesday, and analysts said the price decline seemed to be bottoming out.

Deflation in the world's top liquefied natural gas exporter has been easing gradually over the past months, reaching an annualised 2.1 percent in August, as its hydrocarbon based economy recovered from last year's sharp slowdown.

Living costs in the cash rich OPEC member remained flat from the previous month after August's 0.1 percent month-on-month rise, as a food price jump was offset by a drop in transport costs, data from Qatar Statistics Authority showed.

John Sfakianakis, chief economist at Banque Saudi Fransi said: "Deflation should now begin to bottom out, given that we are seeing two consecutive months of no deflationary trends."

He said: "In coming months we might see a small reversal of deflationary trends, but the overall average for the year will be deflationary, because of the strong deflationary trends for the first half of the year."

The International Monetary Fund said in February that the extent of Qatari deflation might be overestimated as measurement of rents is skewed towards new contracts, which had witnessed sharp falls in rents at the beginning of the year.

Qatar's central bank cited continued deflation as one of the reasons behind a 50 basis point cut in its deposit rate in August. Housing costs, which have the largest 32 percent weight in the overall basket, were stable month-on-month in September after a 0.4 percent dip in the previous month.

Transport and communication prices fell 0.8 percent after a 0.3 percent rise in August, while food costs soared 1.5 percent in September after staying flat in the previous month.

Food prices usually rise during the holy month of Ramadan, which ended in mid September, as families enjoy larger and more elaborate evening meals after daylight fasting.

Farah Ahmed Hersi, senior economist at Masraf Al Rayan in Doha said: "It's clearly out of the question that we will always be in a deflationary position. The economy is now growing at a double-digit rate, and that generates a certain amount of inflation."

Qatar's economy is seen largely outperforming fellow Gulf energy producers with expected growth of 15.5 percent this year, up from 8.7 percent in 2009, mainly due to expansion of its gas output and government infrastructure spending.

Analysts polled by Reuters expected average deflation of 1.7 percent in 2010, after consumer prices fell by 4.9 percent last year, the first full year of deflation since 1993.

Source

Thursday, 25 November 2010

Threat of a double-dip deflation

What’s happening in the US, euro zone and Japan points to a hard slog ahead.

MORE than a year ago (on May 9) I wrote in this column – “Deflation is not an option”, worried as the world was then of the possible coming to pass of the worse-case scenario, and that “the brutal truth is, less-worse is not recovery. The world is not out of the woods yet …”

But by late September, things had begun to brighten up. The Pittsburgh G-20 Summit pronounced triumphantly that the vast global stimuli “had worked” – indeed, it rescued the world from the knife’s edge of the most severe recession since the Great “D”.

What a difference a year makes. In May this year, I wrote “PIIGS can’t fly: the Greek tragedy”, brought about by Greece’s insolvency spreading ripple effects all over the euro zone. Overall, the Greece debacle casts a long shadow over market sentiment which has since become dormant, as of now. But many risks still remain.

Double-dip talk amidst unusual uncertainty

It is amazing how fast things do change. My column in mid-June –“In for a bumpy ride: perhaps even a double-dip?” reflected the fragility of the evolving situation. In the face of a weakening economy, premature tightening raises the risk of a relapse into recession.

Markets have since moved with greater volatility, essentially nervous about fiscal deterioration in US and many euro zone nations, and a darkening growth outlook outside Germany. Any upheaval there raises further the risk of a double-dip.

Indeed, Wall Street has since become increasingly convinced fiscal tightening by UK and euro zone nations and recent lack of confidence in US have dramatically shifted global macroeconomics for the worse. I hear many leading fund managers are already acting to re-position their funds for a double-dip recession – just in case. Some have even started to aggressively de-risk their portfolios.

How real is the risk of a double-dip? For sure, recovery has lost momentum. Second quarter (Q2) GDP growth in the US is lacklustre at 2.4% annual pace, down from 3.7% in Q1, and below expectations. Key components exports and consumption contributed less to growth than in Q1.

In the 12 months since the onset of recession, the economy grew just 2.3%. In contrast, during the equivalent period after the ’81-’82 recession, output rose 5.6%. It is clear the initial boost to demand from inventory build-up has faded.

The housing bust still casts a long shadow. US home sales fell 27.2% in July to a 15-year low. Households are saving more to work off debts. Worse, firms fearful of the future are preferring to squeeze yet more output from existing employees.

So, unemployment is stuck at 9.5%, even though US corporates are flush with cash. Yet, bank credit is scarce. Bankers have turned risk-adverse. All these stand in the way of a wholesome recovery. Little wonder businesses are reluctant to hire with such “unusual uncertainty” as Fed chairman Bernanke puts it.

No doubt, the risk of double-dip has since increased. So much so the Fed recently made a U-turn to counter a weakening US recovery by resuming quantitative easing (dubbed QE2) through re-investing cash from nearly US$1.3 trillion of maturing mortgage-linked debt.

By buying new debt, the Fed pushes bond prices up and long-term interest rates down (since bond yields move inversely to prices). This way, it increases money supply and stimulates growth as credit eases. The message to the market is clear – the Fed will do everything and anything to put a back-stop on the risk of a double-dip!

But, as Professor N. Roubini aptly describes it, “whatever letter of the alphabet the US economic performance ultimately resembles, what is coming will feel like a recession.”

According to Prof M. Boskin of Stanford, double-dip downturns are technically more the rule than the exception. The US ’01 recession was one brief, mild double-dip. Within the current recession, there is already a “double-dip”: a dip at the start of ’08, some growth, another long deep dip, then renewed growth.

Another dip is still possible – it will represent a triple-dip. But not yet an outright second recession which is what most are concerned. In Europe, in the early ‘80s, UK, Japan, Germany and Italy all had double-dips.

History suggests economies seldom grow out of recessions continuously, without occasional subsequent falls. Dips – double, triple and even quadruple – have been part of the US recessionary experience since WWII. So, it should not be surprising to see another decline in growth before sustained stronger growth emerges.

I note the Fed has become concerned over the long time it will take the US to achieve full recovery (and restore the eight million odd jobs lost since the onset of recession) as economic growth turned more sluggish. In addition, the downside risk of a double-dip recession and a deflationary spiral has since increased. Fears of deflation on the back of a still faltering inflation and worries about the return of recession is now flavour of the month.

Deflation is poorly understood

What is deflation? Why worry about it? Deflation refers to persistent and sustained falls in prices. It is usually associated with the Great Depression and its cause – a sharp drop in demand. With it, incomes, consumer prices and asset prices fall. Interest rates move towards zero.

But the cost to borrowers in servicing doesn’t fall, sucking live out of the economy and pushing prices further down. This bad situation gets worse. In 1932, US consumer prices fell 10%; between ’29 and ’33, they fell 27%.

The most recent experience is in Japan but it pales in comparison. Rather than being deep, destructive and concentrated in a few years, Japanese deflation is a mild, drawn-out affair. Consumer prices faltered for 15 years, but never by more than 2% a year. It has been a morass but not a destructive downward spiral.

Why? Economics don’t have a way to rationalise steady multi-year flat deflation. Japan remains a puzzle because its problems persisted for so long. Some turn to the psychology of households and businesses for the answer – if people believe prices will fall, they act to create the environment that becomes self-fulfilling. Government plays a role through intervention to keep the economy from going through the floor. Other explanations include consumers who are aging and thus, more inclined to save for old age instead of spend.

But deflation is not all bad. For some, falling prices are good because incomes and assets can buy more. Such “good deflation” occurred in US in 1870-95 in the face of strong economic growth, during a period of rising productivity and technological innovation.

Falling electronic goods prices are a modern-day example of good deflation. However, deflation has its bad side – falling prices are associated with falling wages, rising unemployment and falling asset prices. In the US in the ‘30s and more recently in Japan, deflation reflected economic collapse and rising unemployment made worse by high debt and falling asset prices. This delays spending and weakens economic activity.

In today’s environment of high household and public debt, deflation raises the real value of debt in the face of falling asset prices and declining incomes and public revenues. To the extent households and government attempt to reduce their debt burden by cutting spending and selling assets, a “debt deflation” spiral can set in, and so will a double-dip recession.

With “core” inflation (i.e. excluding fuel and food) now below 1% in the US, euro zone and Japan and headline inflation falling again, it is little wonder deflation worries have re-surfaced. The key to inflation outlook lies in capacity utilisation.

Historically, inflation falls or remains weak when business capacity utilisation is well below normal (as in ’08-09 recession). The bottomline is simple: as long as recovery in the US, euro zone and Japan remains anaemic and excess capacity in industry and labour markets remains high, inflation will likely fall further.

If major developed nations return to recession, the risk of deflation will rise. As a general rule, deflation favours cash and government bonds over equities, property and corporate bonds, as well as defensive shares like utility stocks. It’s now clear more aggressive QE2 and sticky service prices are being relied upon to break the back of possible sustained deflation. But with oodles of global spare capacity, I see risks favouring deflation rather than a return bout of inflation.

Concern but not panic

Make no mistake, the threat of deflation is taken seriously on Wall Street. Bond fund heavyweights like El-Erien (who manages US$1 trillion plus in assets) bet US has a 25% chance of falling into deflation. Put it this way: if I told you that my kid has chicken pox and there is a 1 in 4 chance of passing it on, would you allow your kid to come over and play?

To many, the US faces a serious risk of falling into deflation. As slowdown takes hold, consumer prices fell 0.1% in June after falling 0.2% the month before. Growing increasingly wary of deflation (which eats into corporate profits and raises real borrowing costs), many fund managers are prompted to hedge against stock falls, while buying interest-bearing assets.Indeed, it has altered behaviour by encouraging firms to accumulate cash, unthinkable a year ago. Investors pile onto public bonds where fixed interest payments provide good returns when prices and stocks are falling. Investors are positioned well ahead of the Fed.

This surge in bonds has pushed yields to multi-year lows. Ten-year US Treasuries yield dropped to a 20-month low of 2.418% in late August, while its 2-year yield marked an all time low of 0.498%. I think there is still room down; yields are still too high. After all, the yield on 10-year Treasuries is still 1.7 percentage points higher than the Japanese. In euro zone (considered to be more prone to deflation than the US) the gap is still 1.5 percentage points. As I see it, bond investors are slow to catch on, as Japanese were when deflation began. Since late 1992, average Japanese inflation was negative 0.1%, but it took six years for yields on 10-year bonds to move from 5% to less than 2%. Today, it’s 0.9%. The question remains: are US bonds selling at too high a price? Only time will tell.

Biflation

The risk of deflation varies between regions. Japan is already in deflation. The risk is highest in the euro zone because recent fiscal tightening and hard-line approach to monetary easing imply rising risk of a faltering economy. In contrast big nations in Asia (notably China and India) have had strong growth with less spare capacity, and hence higher inflation; the risk of deflation is much less.

That’s the real world where biflation exists, i.e. where deflation and inflation co-exist in different parts of the world. It even exists in different parts of the same economy: rising prices for globally traded commodities and falling prices for homes and autos bought with credit domestically.

As I see it, the anxiety about a double-dip deflation is well founded. The Fed has sent the right signal – one of concern but not panic. It is unclear more stimulus will create more jobs, suggesting unemployment may have deeper roots. What’s happening in the US, euro zone and Japan point to a hard slog ahead. Asia seems able to hold itself. But clearly, its ability to decouple from the developed world has still to be fully tested. Much interdependency remains.

Yet, not so long ago, the US was confidently moving forward and the euro zone the laggard. The dollar was riding high as investors fled from Euro’s debt crisis. Within months, the roles were reversed, with Asia still squeezed in the middle – but confident and kicking. This underlines the critical point for public policy: the economic fortunes of the US, Europe and Asia are as tightly bound as ever.

By the Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching & promoting the public interest.

 (We took it from another blog source)

How to Reverse a Deflation

The Fed is proposing another round of “quantitative easing,” although the first round failed to reverse deflation.  It failed because the money went into the coffers of banks, which failed to lend it on.  To reverse deflation, the money needs to be funneled directly to state and local economies.

In 2002, in a speech that earned him the nickname “Helicopter Ben,” then-Fed Governor Bernanke famously said that the government could easily reverse a deflation, just by printing money and dropping it from helicopters.  “The U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent),” he said, “that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.”  Later in the speech he discussed “a money-financed tax cut,” which he said was “essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman’s famous ‘helicopter drop’ of money.”  You could cure a deflation, said Professor Friedman, simply by dropping money from helicopters.

It seems logical enough.  If there is insufficient money in the money supply (deflation), the solution is to put more money into it.  But if deflation is so easy to fix, then why has the Fed’s massive attempts to date failed to do the job?  At the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole summit on August 27, Chairman Bernanke said he would fight deflation with his whole arsenal, including “quantitative easing” (QE) – purchasing long-term securities with money created on a computer.  Yet since 2008, the Fed has added more than $1.2 trillion to “base money” doing just that, and the economy is still in a serious deflationary spiral.  In the first quarter of this year, the money supply actually shrank at a record annual rate of 9.6%. 

Cullen Roche at The Pragmatic Capitalist has an answer to that puzzle.  He says that as currently practiced, quantitative easing (QE) is not really a money drop.  It is just an asset swap:

 The Fed doesn’t actually ‘print’ anything when it initiates its QE policy.  The Fed simply electronically swaps an asset with the private sector.  In most cases it swaps deposits with an interest bearing asset.

The Fed just swaps Federal Reserve Notes (dollar bills) for other assets (promissory notes or debt) that can quickly be turned into money.  The Fed is merely trading one form of liquidity for another, without raising the overall water level in the pool.

The mechanics of how QE works were revealed in a remarkable segment on National Public Radio on August 26, describing how a team of Fed employees bought $1.25 trillion in mortgage bonds beginning in late 2008.  According to NPR:

The Fed was able to spend so much money so quickly because it has a unique power: It can create money out of thin air, whenever it decides to do so.  So … the mortgage team would decide to buy a bond, they’d push a button on the computer – ‘and voila, money is created.’

The thing about bonds, of course, is that people pay them back.  So that $1.25 trillion in mortgage bonds will shrink over time, as they get repaid.  Earlier this month, the Fed announced that it will use the proceeds from the mortgage bonds to buy Treasury bonds – essentially keeping all that newly created money in circulation.  The decision was a sign that the Fed thinks the economy still needs to be propped up with extraordinary measures.

“Extraordinary measures” was a reference to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which allows the Fed in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to buy “notes, drafts and bills of  exchange” (debt instruments) from “any individual, partnership or corporation” satisfying its requirements.  The Fed was supposedly engaging in these extraordinary measures to “reflate” the money supply and get credit flowing again.  Yet the money supply continued to shrink.  The problem, as Roche explains, is that the dollars were merely being swapped for other highly liquid assets on bank balance sheets.  That this sort of asset swap will not pump up a collapsed money supply has been shown not only by the Fed’s failed experiments over the last two years but by two decades of failed QE policy in Japan, an economy which remains in the deflationary doldrums.  To reverse deflation, it seems, QE needs to be directed somewhere else besides the balance
sheets of private banks.  What we need is the sort of helicopter drop described by Bernanke in 2002 – one over the towns and cities of the real economy.

There is another interesting lesson suggested by two decades of failed QE: it might actually be possible for the government to “print” its way out of debt, without triggering the dreaded hyperinflation long warned of by pundits.  Swapping dollars for debt hasn’t inflated the circulating money supply to date because federal debt securities already serve as forms of “money” in the economy.

The Textbook Money Multiplier Model . . .  And Why It Is Obsolete

Beginning with some definitions, “quantitative easing” is explained in Wikipedia like this:

A central bank … first credit[s] its own account with money it has created ex nihilo (‘out of nothing’). It then purchases financial assets, including government bonds, mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds, from banks and other financial institutions in a process referred to as open market operations.  The purchases, by way of account deposits, give banks the excess reserves required for them to create new money, and thus a hopeful stimulation of the economy, by the process of deposit multiplication from increased lending in the fractional reserve banking system.

“Deposit multiplication” is the textbook explanation for how credit expands as it circulates through the economy.  In the textbook model, banks must retain “reserves” equal to 10% of outstanding deposits (including deposits created as loans).  With a 10% reserve requirement, a $100 deposit can support a $90 loan, which gets deposited in another bank, where it becomes an $81 loan, and so forth, until a $100 deposit becomes $1,000 in credit-money.

The theory is that increasing the banks’ reserves will stimulate this process, but both the Federal Reserve and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) now concede that the process has not been working in the textbook way.  (The BIS is “the central bankers’ central bank” in Basel, Switzerland.)  The futile effort to push more money into bloated bank reserve accounts has been compared to adding more apples to shelves that are already overstocked with apples.  Adding more reserves to a banking system that already has more reserves than it can use has no net effect on the money supply.

The failure of QE either to increase bank lending or to inflate the money supply was confirmed in a March 24 paper by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn, who wrote:

 The huge quantity of bank reserves that were created [by quantitative easing] has been seen largely as a byproduct of the purchases [of debt instruments] that would be unlikely to have a significant independent effect on financial markets and the economy. This view is not consistent with the simple models in many textbooks or the monetarist tradition in monetary policy, which emphasizes a line of causation from reserves to the money supply to economic activity and inflation.

The textbook model is obsolete because banks don’t make lending decisions based on how many reserves they have.  They can always get the reserves they need.  If customers don’t walk in the door with new deposits, the bank can borrow deposits from other banks, something they can now do at the very low Fed funds rate of .2% (1/5th of 1%).  And if those deposits are not available, the Federal Reserve itself will supply the reserves.  This was confirmed in a BIS working paper called “Unconventional Monetary Policies: An Appraisal”, which observed:

[T]he level of reserves hardly figures in banks’ lending decisions. The amount of credit outstanding is determined by banks’ willingness to supply loans, based on perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. …

The aggregate availability of bank reserves does not constrain the expansion [of credit] directly. The reason is simple: … in order to avoid extreme volatility in the interest rate, central banks supply reserves as demanded by the system. From this perspective, a reserve requirement, depending on its remuneration, affects the cost … of loans, but does not constrain credit expansion quantitatively…. [A]n expansion of reserves in excess of any requirement does not give banks more resources to expand lending. It only changes the composition of liquid assets of the banking system. Given the very high substitutability between bank reserves and other government assets held for liquidity purposes, the impact can be marginal at best.

Again, one form of liquidity is just substituted for another, without changing the overall level in the pool.

If bank reserves do not constrain bank lending, what does?  According to the BIS paper, “the main … constraint on the expansion of credit is minimum capital requirements.”  These capital requirements, known as “Basel I” and “Basel II,” were imposed by the BIS itself.  It is interesting that the BIS knows that the main constraints on bank lending are its own capital requirements, yet it is talking about raising them, in an economic climate in which lending is already seriously impaired.  Either the BIS is talking out of both sides of its mouth, or its writers don’t read each other.

A Solution to the Federal Debt Crisis?

Another interesting aside arising from all this is the suggestion that the government could actually print its way out of debt – it could print dollars and buy back its bonds — without creating inflation.  As Roche observes:

[Quantitative easing] in time of a balance sheet recession is not actually inflationary at all.  With the government merely swapping assets they are not actually ‘printing’ any new money.  In fact, the government is now essentially stealing interest bearing assets from the private sector and replacing them with deposits.  . . . [T]his policy response would in fact be deflationary – not inflationary.”

Roche concludes, “the inflationistas have been wrong and the USA defaultistas have been horribly wrong.”  The “inflationistas” are the pundits screaming that QE will end in hyperinflation, and the “defaultistas” are those insisting that the U.S. must eventually default on its debt.  Representing both camps, for example, is Richard Russell, who writes:

In my opinion, the US MUST default on its debt. There are two ways to default. One is simply to renege on the debt…. The other way to default on the debt is to inflate it away. I’m absolutely convinced that this is the path that the US will take. If the US inflates enough, then over time (many years) the devalued dollar will tend to reduce the power of the debts.

The failed QE experiments in Japan and the U.S. suggest, however, that there is a third alternative.  Printing dollars to pay the debt (referred to by Russell as “inflating the debt away”) might actually eliminate the debt without creating inflation.  This is because federal bonds and Federal Reserve Notes are interchangeable forms of liquidity.  Government securities trade around the world just as if they were money.  A $100 bond represents a claim on $100 worth of goods and services, just as a $100 bill does.  The difference, as Thomas Edison said nearly a century ago, is merely that “the bond lets money brokers collect twice the amount of the bond and an additional 20%, whereas the currency pays nobody but those who contribute directly in some useful way…. Both are promises to pay, but one promise fattens the usurers and the other helps the people.”

The Fed’s earlier attempts at QE involved swapping $1.25 trillion in mortgaged-backed securities (MBS) for dollars created on a computer screen.  As noted in the NPR segment, many of those securities have come due and have gotten paid off, putting cash in the Fed’s till.  The Fed now proposes to use this money to buy long-term Treasury debt rather than MBS.  That means the Fed will, in effect, be buying the government’s debt with dollars created on a computer screen.  The privately owned Federal Reserve is not actually an arm of the federal government, but if it were, the government would thus be printing its way out of debt – just as Helicopter Ben proposed in 2002.  Recall that he said, “the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press” – the U.S. government, not the central bank that has done all the QE to date.

Running the government’s printing presses to pay its bills has not seriously been tried since the Civil War, when President Lincoln saved the North from a crippling war debt at usurious interest rates by printing Greenbacks (U.S. Notes).  Other countries, however, have tested and proven this model more recently.  They include Germany, which pulled itself out of a massive financial collapse in the early 1930s by printing a form of currency called “MEFO bills”; and Australia, New Zealand and Canada, all of which successfully funded public works in the first half of the twentieth century simply by advancing the credit of the nation.  China, Malaysia, Guernsey, Jersey, India, Argentina and other countries have also revived their economies at critical times by this means.  The U.S. government could do this too.  It could print dollars (or type them into electronic bank accounts) and spend the money on the sorts of local public projects that would
put people back to work and get the economy rolling again.

How to Reverse a Deflation:  Do a Helicopter Drop on the States

The government could pay its bills by issuing Greenbacks as Lincoln did, but it probably won’t, given the current deadlock in Congress.  Today only the Federal Reserve Chairman seems to be in a position to act unilaterally, without asking anyone’s permission.  Chairman Bernanke could execute his own plan and generate the credit needed to get the economy churning again, by aiming his “quantitative easing” tool at the states.  After all, if Wall Street (which got us into this mess) can borrow at 0.2%, underwritten by the Fed as “lender  of last resort,” then state and local governments should be able to as well.  Chairman Bernanke could credit the Fed’s account with money created ex nihilo (out of nothing) and swap it for state and municipal bonds at the Fed funds rate.

A “state” might not qualify as an “individual, partnership or corporation” under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, but a state-owned bank would.  Bruce Cahan, an attorney and social entrepreneur in Silicon Valley, California, proposes that the Fed could diversify its role by buying long-term bonds in existing or newly-chartered state-owned banks.  These banks, which would have a mandate to serve state and local communities, would more quickly and accountably lend for in-state purposes than private banks do now. They could be required to use accepted transparency accounting standards to trace how the proceeds of their loans flowed into the economy.  Local needs would thus determine how best to jumpstart and keep alive businesses and households that the “too big to fail” megabanks no longer want to fund on fair credit terms.  Adding a state-owned bank would also bring competition to regional banking markets such as that of the San
Francisco Bay area, which are now dominated by out-of-state megabanks.  By funding state-owned banks, the Fed could inject “liquidity” where it is most needed, in local markets where workers are hired and real goods and services are sold.